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The impact of foreign investors on  
the risk-taking of Japanese firms 
 
Abstract 
 
Consistent with a bank-centered governance system, Japanese firms exhibit an exceptionally low level 
of performance variability. The increased involvement of foreign investors motivated by shareholder 
value is thus likely to have triggered a major shift in their risk-taking behavior. My results confirm this 
assumption as all standard measures of performance volatility appear to have significantly increased 
with the level of foreign ownership. Controlling for endogeneity provides higher point estimates 
supporting anecdotal evidence that foreign investors have targeted firms taking unusually low risk. 
Overall, the evidence highlights the considerable impact that this category of investors can have on a 
firm’s decisions and, by consequence, on its performance. 
 
Keywords: foreign ownership; monitoring; risk taking; performance volatility  
JEL classification: G30, G32, G34 
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1. Introduction 
The importance of risk taking is well recognized. To expect a higher return, investors must 
take more risk. At the firm level, a similar tradeoff exists. To create shareholder value, firms 
must invest in projects that are associated with high idiosyncratic risk. However, managers 
are typically reluctant to undertake this type of project (Fama, 1980). While shareholders can 
easily diversify away the firm’s specific risk, managers continue to carry that risk. As a result, 
they may prefer to forgo positive NPV projects that have high idiosyncratic risk. May (1995) 
and Holmstrom (1999) explain that managers consider their personal welfare when making 
decisions that affect their firm’s risk profile. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) show that 
whenever they are given the opportunity, plant managers choose to take less risk. Similarly, 
Amihud and Lev (1981) suggest that one of the motivations for undertaking unrelated 
mergers, which usually destroy shareholder value, is to reduce the risk to their human capital.  
 
To mitigate the propensity of managers to avoid risk, one approach is to provide equity-based 
compensation. Smith and Stulz (1985), Dechow and Sloan (1991) and Wright et al. (2007) 
argue that this type of contract contributes to align the incentives of managers with those of 
shareholders, thus resulting in higher risk taking. The alternative approach to curb deviations 
from optimal risk-taking is to improve the firm’s governance structure. In line with this view, 
John et al. (2008) show that better governance is associated with greater risk-taking measured 
by cash flow volatility. Low (2009) highlights the disciplinary role of takeover threats. 
According to her findings, US firms that became less exposed to takeovers due to an 
exogenous change in regulation reduced their risk taking. However, the propensity to cut risk 
was moderated when managers had equity incentives.  
 
In this paper, my objective is to evaluate the influence of foreign investors on the risk-taking 
behavior of Japanese firms. Regardless of the target country (here, Japan), the effect of 
foreign investors is expected to be positive since they tend to be large institutions that have 
the power to influence a firm’s policy (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Gillan and Starks, 2003; 
Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach, 2009). In particular, they should be able to mitigate the 
widespread tendency of managers to take insufficient risk. Domestic institutions are unlikely 
to exert a similar influence. Concerns about existing business relationships prevent them from 
being too critical of management decisions (Ferreira and Matos, 2008; Jackson and Moerke, 
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2005). In contrast, foreign investors are less hindered by such ties and should therefore be 
more potent monitors. 
 
In the particular case of Japan (the target country) the impact of foreign investors is expected 
to be even stronger due to the exceptionally low level of corporate risk taking. As a matter of 
fact, the cross-country study of John et al. (2008) reveals that Japanese firms exhibit the 
lowest cash flow volatility. This low level of risk taking can be explained by a governance 
system that is relatively favorable to creditors (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Acharya et al., 
2011). In this situation, the main objective is less to maximize the firm’s value than it is to 
preserve its survival and ability to repay its debt. In addition, the practice of lifetime 
employment implies that human capital is largely tied to the firm, which suggests that 
managers will be very reluctant to take the risk of going bust.1 From a cultural viewpoint, risk 
taking is viewed with hostility in Japan unlike in the US where it is celebrated.2 To emphasize 
this point, individual rewards tend to be small even for employees making outstanding 
contributions to their organizations. Further, the tendency to seek consensus in decision 
making suggests a lower degree of risk taking consistent with the theoretical models of Sah 
and Stiglitz (1986, 1991) and empirical evidence in Adams and Ferreira (2010).  
 
Following Cheng (2008) my investigation begins with a cross-sectional analysis. The results 
show a strong positive relation between foreign ownership and corporate risk taking. In 
contrast, domestic institutional ownership is associated with lower risk taking. I then use an 
instrumental variable approach to control for the endogeneity of foreign ownership.3 My 
instruments are indicators of whether the firm had an ADR or was a constituent of the MSCI 
World index in 1998 which is the beginning of the sample period. Ferreira and Matos (2008), 
Ferreira et al. (2010) and Aggarwal et al. (2011) establish that both variables are strong 
determinants of foreign ownership. In addition, they are unlikely to involve the firm’s risk 
taking except indirectly through other independent variables, which over-identification tests 
clearly confirm. The reason is that ADRs have been issued with a totally unrelated purpose (to 
increase the firm’s visibility in the US market) while inclusion in the MSCI index is based on 
the firm’s industry affiliation and market value (and not the firm’s risk profile). Hence, 
                                                 
1 Ono (2010) provides extensive evidence regarding the continuing practice of lifetime employment in Japan.  
2 According to Hofstede’s (2001) analysis, Japan is characterized by a high degree of uncertainty avoidance.  
3 Indeed, the positive relation between foreign ownership and risk taking may derive from the fact that foreign 
investors prefer to invest in high risk firms. In this respect, Ferreira and Matos (2008) show that high foreign 
institutional ownership is associated with high firm-level idiosyncratic variance.  
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conditioning on the instruments achieves the same result as a randomized assignment (i.e., it 
compares different levels of foreign ownership that are formed without connection to the 
firm’s risk taking). 
 
In a preliminary analysis, I show that foreign investors tend to select low-risk firms, 
especially those with a low ROA volatility. 4  This finding is consistent with anecdotal 
evidence that foreign investors have picked out cash-rich firms and the fact that these firms 
are characterized by lower risk.5 This finding also suggests that OLS estimates are likely to be 
understated and explains why instrumental variable regressions point to a stronger positive 
effect for foreign ownership.  
 
I also take into account unobserved firm characteristics by running panel regressions with 
fixed firm effects. In line with Adams et al. (2005) risk is measured for each firm and each 
year by the absolute deviation from the firm’s expected performance (for ROA and Tobin’s 
Q). Detection of a statistically significant effect is facilitated by the substantial time-variation 
in foreign ownership. This is not the case of most governance variables which barely change 
over time (Zhou, 2001). Indeed, I show that the probability for foreign ownership to move to 
a different quartile within one year can be as high as 34.2 percent. Aggarwal et al. (2011) use 
this time-variation to establish the impact of foreign investors on firm-level corporate 
governance. Finally, I show that other ex ante measures of risk taking, such as the volume of 
R&D investments and acquisitions, increase with increases in the level of foreign ownership.  
 
This paper contributes to the emerging and rapidly-growing literature regarding the role of 
foreign investors. Ferreira and Matos (2008) document that foreign institutional ownership is 
associated with higher firm value and performance outside of the US. Ferreira et al. (2010) 
show that it is also significantly associated with the intensity of cross-border M&A activity. 
Aggarwal et al. (2011) provide evidence that foreign investors increase the firm’s corporate 
governance and improve its market value by increasing the likelihood that poorly-performing 
managers are dismissed. My contribution is to show that foreign investors can also strongly 
                                                 
4 The aim may be to mitigate an unusual level of risk aversion or to induce firms to implement new policies that 
result in higher risk-taking. In this respect, the strategy adopted by Shinsei Bank is particularly revealing. In 
2000, Shinsei became the first Japanese bank to be controlled by a group of foreign investors. Following a more 
aggressive business model, the bank heavily invested in collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) compared to 
other Japanese banks which by and large have avoided these risky financial products.  
5 See Baba (2009) for anecdotal evidence taken from the financial press.  
5 
 
influence another fundamental dimension of a firm’s policy which is its risk taking behavior. 
By documenting that foreign investors have a significant effect on corporate risk taking, this 
study supports the view that they are also likely to have an impact on firm performance.  
 
The results are consistent with a number of studies highlighting the role of foreign ownership 
in Japan. Ahmadjian and Robbins (2005) show that foreign investors increase the likelihood 
of divestitures and downsizing which are typically associated with higher firm performance. 
Nagaoka (2006) confirms that increases in foreign ownership are associated with higher firm 
value. David et al. (2006) provide evidence that foreign investors promote R&D investments 
when firms exhibit better growth opportunities. Baba (2009) reveals that their growing 
participation in the Japanese stock market has lead to a significant increase in dividend payout. 
Hamao et al. (2010) explain that foreign institutional investors facilitate the initiatives of 
activist funds requesting greater distributions, and are therefore associated with a significant 
decrease in cash holdings. Apart from its specific focus on corporate risk taking, this paper 
improves on earlier studies by controlling for the endogeneity of foreign ownership. This 
issue is critical since the portfolio allocation of foreign investors is far from being randomly 
distributed.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and methodology. 
Section 3 presents the empirical results. I start with a standard cross sectional (OLS) analysis 
which is extended by instrumenting the foreign ownership variable. The panel analysis that 
follows takes into account unobservable firm characteristics. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Data and methodology  
2.1. Sample and data sources 
The base sample is represented by all Japanese firms listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange 
over the period 1998-2007. One reason to start in 1998 is because consolidated accounts are 
available from that year. A more important reason is because the late 1990s coincides with the 
time when foreign investors, and especially hedge funds, started to strongly increase their 
holdings of Japanese stocks (Hamao et al., 2010). Financial institutions, i.e. banks, securities 
and insurance companies, are excluded because of their different performance and risk-taking 
metrics. I also require at least 6 consecutive years of data to compute performance volatility 
measures. This reduces the sample to 1,615 firms providing 15,619 firm-year observations.  
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As in Baba (2009) my main data source is AMSUS (Active Management Support System) 
supplied by Quick Corp. The primary data is the same as Nikkei NEEDS which has been 
extensively used in Japanese accounting and finance research. The database also provides 
aggregate shareholding information, such as institutional ownership, corporate ownership and 
foreign ownership. Kang and Stulz (1997) observe that Japan is the only major country where 
this type of ownership information is widely available. To control for the endogeneity of 
foreign ownership,6 I retrieved information on ADR listings from adr.com, while data related 
to the constituents of the MSCI World index was kindly provided by MSCI-Barra.7  
 
2.2. Measurement and determinants of risk 
The main empirical issue is to measure and relate risk to its potential determinants. In line 
with Cheng (2008) I start by defining risk as the volatility over time of a firm’s performance 
measure (called within-firm across-time volatility). This procedure is relatively standard. In 
fact, it has been extensively applied to stock returns to produce estimates of return volatility 
and its systematic and idiosyncratic components. For example, Nguyen (2011) examines the 
effect of family and bank control on the risk-taking of Japanese firms using relative 
idiosyncratic risk as the measure of risk taking. Likewise, Konishi and Yasuda (2004) 
investigate the role of regulation (capital adequacy requirements) on the risk-taking behavior 
of Japanese banks. 
 
Following Cheng (2008) I consider three measures of performance: ROA, Tobin’s Q and 
stock return.8 ROA is defined as operating income over total assets, Tobin’s Q is proxied by 
the market to book value of assets, and monthly stock returns are adjusted for dividends and 
splits. These three measures are obviously correlated. For instance, higher returns are likely to 
be associated with higher Q ratios. Both also reflect higher realized or anticipated profitability. 
As a result, a positive correlation is likely to exist between the corresponding volatility 
measures. In this regard, Wei and Zhang (2006) show that the higher (idiosyncratic) return 
volatility of US firms can be explained by their greater earnings variability.  
                                                 
6 That is to identify a variation in foreign ownership unrelated to risk-taking. 
7 I thank Victoria Cano from MSCI-Barra for granting me access to this data.  
8  I also consider industry-adjusted performance and find that the results are qualitatively similar to those 
presented in the paper.  
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This way of measuring risk has the obvious drawback of collapsing the initial panel (of 
15,619 firm-year observations) into a single cross section (of 1,615 firms). To explain the 
cross sectional difference in risk, I thus calculate the average value of the explanatory 
variables over the whole sample period. The association between the 3 risk measures and their 
determinants is estimated by OLS with standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity.  
 
iii6
i5i4i3i2i10i
INDAGE
CAPEXDEBTLNTAINSTFOREIGNRISK


 (1) 
RISK represents the standard deviation of ROA, Tobin’s Q (logged) or stock returns 
calculated over the sample period; FOREIGN is the level of foreign ownership; INST is the 
ownership of domestic financial institutions; LNTA is the log of total assets; DEBT is the 
ratio of total debt to total assets; CAPEX is capital expenditures divided by sales; AGE is 
measured by the number of years since the firm’s listing; IND is a vector of industry dummies 
based on the stock exchange’s 2-digit industry classification; and iη is the error term.  
 
2.3. Endogeneity issues 
Significant estimation bias may occur because of the endogeneity of ownership. In particular, 
OLS will overstate the influence of foreign ownership if foreign investors tend to invest in 
high-risk firms (perhaps because of their higher expected returns). On the other hand, if 
foreign investors choose to invest in low-risk firms (perhaps with the intention of correcting 
their suboptimal level of risk-taking) OLS estimates will understate their positive influence on 
the firm’s risk-taking behavior. To address this endogeneity problem, I follow John et al. 
(2008), Ferreira and Matos (2008), Leuz et al. (2009), Ferreira et al. (2010) and Aggarwal et 
al. (2011) and use an instrumental variable approach.  
 
My identification procedure involves two firm-level instruments. The first instrument, ADR, 
indicates that the firm had an active American Depository Receipt (ADR) at the beginning of 
the sample period (in 1998). ADRs decrease the cost of holding and trading foreign stocks for 
a US institution, which suggests that their issuance by Japanese firms should result in higher 
foreign ownership. Analyzing the structure of corporate ownership in Japan, Kang and Stulz 
(1997) show that ADRs are associated with higher levels of foreign ownership. More 
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generally, Ferreira and Matos (2008) and Aggarwal et al. (2011) indicate that ADRs are 
strong determinants of foreign ownership outside of the US. At the same time, existence of an 
ADR does not affect the firm’s operations and funding structure. Hence, there is no reason to 
suspect that it has an effect on the firm’s risk-taking. Furthermore, ADRs were typically used 
as a way to increase a firm’s visibility in overseas product markets. Provided that this decision 
does not exhibit a systematic correlation with the firm’s risk profile, screening based on the 
existence of an ADR (prior to 1998) should mitigate a possible self-selection bias.9  
 
The second instrument, MSCI, indicates that the firm was a constituent of the MSCI World 
index at the beginning of the sample period. Ferreira and Matos (2008) and Leuz et al. (2009) 
show that membership in the index leads to greater investment by foreign institutions. 
Aggarwal et al. (2011) explain that the MSCI index is commonly used by foreign portfolio 
investors, but not by domestic institutions which prefer to use local stock market indexes. 
Hence, the MSCI variable should be highly correlated with the level of foreign ownership. As 
with ADR issuance, inclusion in the MSCI index should not affect a firm’s policy, and 
especially its risk-taking behavior. For the same reason, Aggarwal et al. (2011) argue that it 
should not directly influence a firm’s performance. More importantly, inclusion in the MSCI 
index is based on criteria unrelated to risk taking. Typically the decision involves the firm’s 
market value and industry affiliation. In addition, because many Japanese firms have a similar 
profile (i.e., they are comparable in size and competing in the same product markets) and 
because only a few firms can be selected, inclusion in the MSCI index is often a close call 
that displays the characteristics of a randomized assignment (thus eliminating self-
selection).10  
 
Although the above arguments provide a strong justification for the validity of the instruments, 
it is also important to empirically verify that their suggested properties are actually satisfied. 
Regarding the requirement of significant correlation with the endogenous regressor, I follow 
John et al. (2008) and check the robust F-value for the joint significance of the instruments in 
                                                 
9 More recently, sponsored level-III ADRs have been issued in response to strong demand by US institutions. In 
that case, ADR would not be a valid instrument since it might also be correlated with the possible preference of 
US investors for high-risk firms.  
10 For instance, Japan Airlines (JAL) was included in the MSCI World index, but not All Nippon Airways 
(ANA).  As a result, average foreign ownership is 6.1% for JAL compared to 3.7% for ANA. Similar examples 
of included/non included firms are: Sony and Toshiba (electronic goods), Bridgestone and Yokohama (tires), 
Citizen and Seiko (precision instruments), East Japan Railways and Central Japan Railways (land transportation), 
Sumitomo Chemicals and Mitsui Chemicals (chemical), Kansai Power and Chubu Power (energy production), 
Mitsui Fudosan and Sumitomo Realty (real estate development).   
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explaining foreign ownership in the first-stage equation. In addition, I compute the partial R2 
which measures the fraction of the variation of risk explained by the instruments net of their 
effect through the (other) exogenous variables. Finally, regarding the requirement of absence 
of correlation with the error term, I perform Sargan/Hansen over-identification tests and 
verify that they are not rejected.  
 
2.4. Unobservable firm characteristics 
Another concern is that the results could stem from unobserved firm characteristics, such as 
managerial risk aversion, which could be due to differences in managerial horizons or 
demographic traits. To control for these missing variables, I use a panel regression approach 
with fixed firm-effects. To generate risk estimates for each year, I follow Adams et al. (2005) 
and define risk as the absolute deviation from the firm’s expected performance.  
 
Expected ROA and Tobin’s Q (logged) are predicted with the following models including 
year and industry dummies: 
 
t,iiitt,i6
t,i5t,i4t,i3t,i2t,i10t,i
uINDYRAGE
CAPEXDEBTLNTAINSTFOREIGNROA


 (2) 
t,iiitt,i7t,i6
t,i5t,i4t,i3t,i2t,i10t,i
uINDYRAGECAPEX
DEBTLNTAROAINSTFOREIGN)Qln(


 (3) 
 
Consistent with Adams et al. (2005) and Cheng (2008) I include foreign and institutional 
ownership in the performance equations on the premise that ownership structure affects the 
level as well as the volatility of a firm’s performance.  
 
In equations 2-3, the error term t,iε  represents the unexpected component of performance. 
Since I am interested in the deviation from expected performance, I take the absolute value of 
t,iε  as the proxy for firm i’s risk-taking at time t. This variable is then regressed on the 
variables appearing on the right-hand side of the Tobin’s Q equation.  
 
t,iitt,i7t,i6
t,i5t,i4t,i3t,i2t,i10t,i
vYRAGECAPEX
DEBTLNTAROAINSTFOROWN


 (4) 
10 
 
 
In the above equation, iv is a fixed firm effect. Since the variables on the right-hand side are 
clearly persistent, I follow Petersen (2009) and estimate the equations with standard errors 
clustered by firm. For stock returns, the risk measure is calculated more simply by taking the 
standard deviation of monthly returns over the 12-month period preceding the fiscal year-end. 
This annual volatility is then regressed on the same determinants as in equation 4.  
 
3. Results 
3.1. Sample statistics 
 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the sample. Volatility of ROA is seen to be 
extremely low at less than 2.5% which underlines the aversion of Japanese companies to take 
risk. This figure is consistent with the results of John et al. (2008) in which Japanese firms 
exhibit the lowest level of cash flow volatility in a sample of 39 countries.11 In particular, this 
level is several times lower than the cash flow volatility of US firms (2.1% against 9%). 
Consistent with Hamao et al. (2003) volatility of monthly stock returns is about 11.75% 
which corresponds to an annual volatility of 40.7%. This level is noticeably lower than the 
return volatility of US firms. In contrast to Cheng (2008) Tobin’s Q is entered as a logarithm 
to minimize the influence of outliers.  
 
---- Table 1 about here ---- 
 
All the variables appear to be well-behaved. Average ROA, Tobin’s Q and debt/total assets 
are close to the figures given in Nguyen et al. (2010). On the other hand, average R&D/sales 
is significantly lower since I don’t exclude non-R&D reporting firms. Average foreign 
ownership over the sample period is 8.59%. However, the involvement of foreign investors 
has sharply increased from 6.91% in 1998 to 12.94% in 2007. Baba (2009) reports higher 
ratios for a sample of larger firms (listed on the first section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange).12 
About 5.8% of firms had an ADR and 14.7% were included in the MSCI World index in 1998. 
Finally, the average volume of acquisitions is relatively low (0.225% of total assets) since few 
firms (13.3% in any given year) are active in the market for corporate acquisitions.  
                                                 
11 See also Acharya et al. (2011). 
12 I also find that large firms have significantly higher foreign ownership. See Table 4 in section 3.3. 
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3.2. Cross-sectional regressions 
 
Table 2 presents a cross-sectional analysis similar to Cheng (2008). The models for ROA and 
return volatility in Japan exhibit a similar goodness of fit as in the case of US firms. However, 
I obtain a much better fit for the log of Tobin’s Q than if I had used Tobin’s Q. For the three 
performance measures employed for estimating risk, foreign ownership appears to be 
associated with significantly higher risk. These results are broadly consistent with Ferreira 
and Matos (2008). In contrast, ownership by domestic institutions is associated with lower 
risk, suggesting that their dual role as lenders may interfere with their ability to monitor and 
mitigate the firm’s propensity to shun risk. Concerning the other covariates, the effect of firm 
size is statistically significant and consistently negative which reflects the greater geographic 
and product diversification available to larger firms. Firm age also appears to produce a small 
reduction in risk taking. Consistent with Adams et al. (2005) leverage has a strong positive 
effect on the volatility of stock returns. In contrast Cheng (2008) finds that the leverage has 
no effect on the return volatility of US firms. Capital investments appear to reduce return risk, 
but have a negligible effect on the volatility of ROA and Tobin’s Q which is consistent with 
the findings of Adams et al. (2005) based on US firms.  
 
---- Table 2 about here ---- 
 
The results indicate that the impact of foreign ownership is economically significant. As a 
matter of fact, a one standard deviation increase in foreign ownership can be associated with a 
0.0654  8.91 = 0.58% increase in ROA volatility. This impact is substantial in comparison 
with the 0.5367  1.469 = 0.71% decrease in ROA volatility resulting from a one standard 
deviation increase in firm size (the most significant covariate). As importantly, the impact of 
foreign ownership on ROA volatility is higher compared to the effect of a one standard 
deviation change in firm age (0.26%) or leverage (0.27%). Likewise, a one standard deviation 
increase in foreign ownership is associated with a 0.1255  8.91 = 1.12 % increase in the 
volatility of monthly returns. In contrast, return volatility is expected to be reduced by about 
1.8% (1.6%) following a one standard deviation increase in firm size (decrease in leverage). 
 
To provide a comparison with the effect of board size examined by Cheng (2008) a one 
standard deviation increase in board size can be associated with a 0.0211  0.28 = 0.60% 
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decrease in ROA volatility and a 0.0396  0.28 = 1.13% decrease in return volatility. Thus the 
marginal effects appear to be surprisingly similar, but one should keep in mind that ROA and 
stock return volatility is several times higher in the US.  
 
3.3. Control for endogenous selection 
 
As in other governance studies, there are reasons to suspect reverse causality or simultaneity 
between the level of risk taken by Japanese firms and the investment decisions made by 
foreign investors. For instance, foreign investors may have a preference for high-risk firms 
because they are perceived to offer better investment prospects. Consequently, although 
foreign investors may not induce any change in business policy in the firms in which they 
hold stakes, OLS regressions would suggest a positive effect from foreign ownership. 
Alternatively, risk could be related to trade exposure to overseas markets. For example, a 
large proportion of sales generated in the US should be associated with higher risk because 
firms would face a more competitive environment and because they would be exposed to 
exchange rate fluctuations compared to domestic firms. At the same time, this higher overseas 
exposure may reduce information asymmetries and prompt greater investments from foreign 
investors (Kang and Stulz, 1997). This situation would also generate a positive relationship, 
but no causal effect stemming from foreign ownership.  
 
As a first attempt to dispel concerns that performance variability may cause changes in 
foreign ownership, I follow Cheng (2008) and substitute the first observation of foreign 
ownership to the average ownership in the cross sectional regressions. The point estimates on 
foreign ownership are found to be similar but somewhat smaller. For example, the coefficient 
for ROA volatility is 0.0423 (compared to 0.0654) and the coefficient for return volatility is 
0.0719 (compared to 0.1255). These results are not tabulated to save space. Instead, I use an 
instrumental variable approach. As indicated in section 2.3, the effectiveness of this approach 
critically depends on the availability of valid instruments. In the present case, my instruments 
are indicators of ADR issuance and inclusion in the MSCI World index at the beginning of 
the sample period. I have argued why these instruments are highly correlated with the 
endogenous regressor (i.e., foreign ownership) and unlikely to be correlated with the 
unexplained component of risk-taking (i.e., the error term in the second-stage equation).  
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Before presenting the instrumental variable regressions, it might be useful to examine the role 
played by the instruments in mitigating a possible self-selection bias in foreign ownership. To 
do that, I partition the sample by the level of foreign ownership (higher or lower relative to 
the median) and the value of the instrument (each taken one at a time). Panel A of Table 3 
shows that foreign ownership is more than 10 times higher when the firm has an ADR or is a 
constituent of the MSCI World index. For instance, the odds of being in the high foreign 
ownership group are 5.4:0.4 when firms have an ADR, while firms without ADRs exhibit 
slightly higher odds of being in the low foreign ownership group (49.6:44.6). Tests of 
proportion also reveal that the percentage of firms with high foreign ownership is not equal 
depending on whether the firm has an ADR or not (z = 8.51) or whether the firm is a 
constituent of the MSCI World index or not (z = 14.05). Hence, the instruments appear to 
induce a highly significant cross-sectional difference in foreign ownership.  
 
---- Table 3 about here ---- 
 
In Panel B, I tabulate the unexplained volatility of ROA (the residual of equation 1 without 
FOREIGN on the right-hand side) according to the value of the instrument (in rows) and the 
level of foreign ownership (in columns). For instrument = ADR, the unexplained volatility of 
ROA is clearly higher when foreign ownership is high (the difference is about 0.58%) which 
is consistent with the positive influence of foreign ownership shown in Table 2. But more 
importantly, looking at firms with high foreign ownership, the unexplained volatility of ROA 
is 0.575% when firms have an ADR and only 0.260% when they don’t. Assuming that the 
effect of foreign ownership is uniform across the two groups, the difference (t-stat = 2.316) 
suggests that foreign investors tend to self-select into low-risk firms. This choice is reflected 
in the lower risk (unexplained volatility of ROA) of firms without an ADR (which might be 
subject to a self-selection bias) compared to firms with an ADR (which are supposed to be 
exogenously selected by the instrument, and thus not subject to self-selection). The difference 
is equally significant using the MSCI dummy (t-stat = 2.137). The instrumental variable 
regressions build on this observation to correct for endogenous selection. In contrast, OLS 
regressions are likely to underestimate the effect of foreign ownership on ROA volatility by 
ignoring this negative self-selection bias.  
 
In Panel C and D, I repeat the calculations with the unexplained volatility of ln(Q) and the 
unexplained volatility of stock returns. Again, the level of risk is higher for firms with high 
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foreign ownership.13 But for these firms, the difference according to the existence of an ADR 
or inclusion in the MSCI World index is not statistically significant. Hence, the results 
suggest that endogeneity is not a serious concern for these two risk measures. Hence, 
instrumental variable regressions are likely to give results that are not significantly different 
from the OLS results shown in section 3.2.  
 
Table 4 presents the two-stage least-squares regressions. The first-stage indicates that ADR 
and MSCI are highly significant with the expected signs. In fact, foreign ownership is 3.04% 
higher when Japanese firms had an ADR program and 4.62% higher when they were included 
in the MSCI World index. Jointly, the two instruments are highly significant with a robust F-
value greater than 37. The partial R2 (5.73%) is very significant as the instruments account for 
a sizable proportion of total R2 (48.43%). Consistent with Kang and Stulz (1997), the 
coefficients on the exogenous regressors also indicate that foreign ownership is associated 
with larger, more profitable, better capitalized (with a lower leverage ratio) and rapidly 
growing firms (as suggested by their high capital expenditures).  
 
---- Table 4 about here ---- 
 
The second-stage results show that predicted foreign ownership is highly significant in 
explaining performance variability. All the coefficients are statistically significant and larger 
compared to the OLS estimates, particularly for ROA volatility. This finding is consistent 
with the view that foreign investors have targeted low-risk firms because of their inefficient 
(suboptimal) risk-taking with the purpose of correcting this inefficiency and improving the 
firm’s performance. As Baba (2009) clearly shows, one way to achieve this objective is to 
force firms to reduce their cash reserves by increasing their dividend payouts. An alternative 
explanation suggested by Hamao et al. (2010) is that a significant level of foreign ownership 
is essential for petitions from activist funds clamoring for higher payout to be successful.  
 
Since the number of instruments is larger than the number of endogenous variables (two 
instruments for one endogenous regressor) the exogeneity of the instruments can be tested 
                                                 
13 The difference is about 0.054 (t = 7.97) for the unexplained volatility of ln(Q) and about 1.16% (t = 6.57) for 
the unexplained volatility of stock returns.  
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using the Sargan/Hansen J-test.14 Here, the test indicates that the instruments are valid since 
the hypothesis of an absence of correlation between the instruments and the error term in the 
second-stage equation(s) cannot be rejected, except for the volatility of stock returns where 
the test is rejected at the 10% level.15 Hence, the instruments (ADR and MSCI) can be 
legitimately excluded from the second-stage regressions.  
 
Attention to the exogeneity of the instruments explains why I do not include cash holdings 
and dividend payout as instruments, despite indications that they determine the level of 
foreign ownership in Japan (Baba, 2009). Indeed, I find that foreign ownership exhibits a 
strong positive (negative) association with the firm’s cash holdings (payout ratio) consistent 
with the view that foreign investors have targeted cash-rich firms.16 However, these variables 
are also highly correlated with all the risk-taking measures. For instance, cash holdings 
contribute to a significant proportion of the cross sectional variation in risk, and hence does 
not qualify as a valid instrument.17 The dummy variable indicating that the firm has granted 
executive stock options is also strongly correlated with foreign ownership consistent with the 
notion that foreigner prefer to invest in better-governed firms (Leuz et al., 2009). But 
although the over-identification tests suggest that it has no influence on risk taking (perhaps 
because the amount of options is not particularly high) I prefer not to use it as an instrument 
because incentives theory suggests that stock options should encourage risk taking. 
 
Finally, I present the Durbin and Wu-Hausman endogeneity tests. In the case of ROA 
volatility, exogeneity of foreign ownership is strongly rejected. This is consistent with the 
results in Panel B of Table 3.  Because foreign investors tend to select firms with low ROA 
volatility, OLS estimates are negatively biased. Correction for this bias leads to significantly 
                                                 
14 The output is directly obtained with the command ivreg2 in Stata. Alternatively, it can be calculated by saving 
the error term from the second-stage regression; then regressing this error term on the excluded instruments and 
other control variables. The F-test for the joint significance of the instruments multiplied by the number of 
instruments is 2 distributed with 1 degree of freedom. For information, the critical values at the 10%, 5% and 
1% levels are respectively 2.71, 3.84 and 6.63. 
15 But even in this case where the instruments appear to be semi-endogenous, Larcker and Rusticus (2010) show 
that 2SLS are still preferable to OLS because of the low correlation between the instruments and the unexplained 
volatility of stock returns compared to the much higher correlation between foreign ownership and stock return 
volatility and the very high correlation between the instruments and foreign ownership.  
16 Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) document that foreign investors in Sweden also display a strong preference 
for firms with large cash positions and firms paying low dividends. 
17 Firms are likely to increase their cash holdings if they anticipate an increase in risk. Hence the positive 
association between cash balances at the beginning of the period and risk measured over the subsequent period.  
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higher 2SLS coefficients (0.1626 compared to 0.0654). In contrast, exogeneity of foreign 
ownership cannot be rejected for the volatility of ln(Q) and the volatility of stock returns. This 
is also consistent with the results indicated in Table 3 (Panel C and D). Since there does not 
appear to be self-selection with respect to these two risk measures, the OLS estimates should 
be preferred because of their greater efficiency. In any case, the estimates using 2SLS are not 
very different from the OLS estimates.18  
 
3.4. Fixed effect regressions 
 
To better control for unobserved firm characteristics and to provide stronger evidence of 
causality, I now use fixed effect regressions on measures of performance volatility calculated 
each year. This approach is made possible by the significant time-variation in the foreign 
ownership variable. Aggarwal et al. (2011) exploit a similar time variation across countries to 
establish the impact of foreign ownership on firm-level corporate governance and 
performance.19 In contrast, most governance studies have been restricted to using random 
effect regressions given the highly persistent nature of most governance variables examined in 
the literature (e.g., managerial ownership, board size or CEO power).20,21  
 
To confirm the significant time variation in foreign ownership, I start by computing the 
transition probabilities between ownership quartiles. The results in the upper panel of Table 5 
show that foreign ownership tends to remain high in firms where it is already high. Indeed, 
the probably to stay in the high ownership quartile is more than 86%. Similarly, firms in the 
low foreign ownership quartile have a probability of more than 79% to remain in that quartile. 
However, the likelihood of staying in any of the two middle quartiles is only about 2/3. In fact, 
there is a nontrivial probability that foreign ownership increases or decreases by two quartiles 
                                                 
18 I also find that using ADR or MSCI separately as instruments yields similar results. 
19 Using firm fixed effects, Nagaoka (2006) shows that foreign ownership is the only governance variable that 
has a consistent influence on firm value in Japan. Managerial ownership and ownership concentration are found 
to be significant using random firm effects, but their influence on firm valuation generally disappears when fixed 
effects are used.  
20 For example, Gompers et al. (2003) indicate that their anti-takeover index is relatively stable at the firm level 
and observe that most of the time-variation affecting the index comes from changes in the sample due to mergers, 
bankruptcies, and inclusion of new firms.  
21 In the absence of substantial time-variation, Zhou (2001) shows that fixed firm effects may fail to detect a 
relationship even when the data is known to contain one.  
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in the space of one year. This time variation is in sharp contrast to the relative stability of 
management ownership and other governance variables (Zhou, 2001; Gompers et al., 2003).  
 
---- Table 5 about here ---- 
 
To offer a point of comparison, I repeat the same analysis for domestic institutional 
ownership. The results in the lower panel of Table 5 indicate that this type of ownership is 
more stable over time. For instance, when domestic institutions hold a relatively large stake, 
this stake is likely to remain high the following year (with a probability of 90.8%). The 
likelihood of staying in any of the two middle quartiles is also noticeably higher (by about 
10%) compared to foreign ownership. 
 
Table 6 presents the results of the fixed effect regressions. It appears that foreign ownership 
has a significant effect on corporate risk taking. The coefficient for the volatility of ROA is 
0.0252 with a robust (clustered) t-ratio of 3.62, while for the volatility of ln(Q) the coefficient 
is 0.0016 with a robust (clustered) t-ratio of 3.46. In contrast, changes in institutional 
ownership are associated with insignificant changes in the volatility of both performance 
measures. For the volatility of stock returns, the effect of institutional ownership becomes 
significantly negative while the coefficient on foreign ownership retains its positive 
significance. Hence, the regressions clearly show that an increase in foreign ownership can be 
linked to a significant increase in performance volatility just as an increase in firm size can be 
linked to a significant decrease in performance volatility. Interestingly, further results (not 
tabulated) suggest that the effect of foreign ownership on risk is symmetric. Increases and 
decreases of foreign ownership lead to increases or decreases in risk of similar magnitude.  
 
---- Table 6 about here ---- 
 
3.5 Ex ante measures of risk 
 
As a final point, I provide results for three ex-ante measures of risk taking: R&D intensity, 
advertising expenditures, and acquisitions. Kothari et al. (2002) argue that R&D expenses 
correspond to investments in high-risk projects. As a matter of fact, the rationale for the 
expensing of R&D investments (rather than their capitalization) is to reflect their highly 
uncertain payoffs. According to Cheng (2008) this explains why firms with larger boards, 
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which tend to be more risk averse, are characterized by lower R&D expenditures. Likewise, 
Coles et al. (2006) relate increases in R&D expenditures to managerial incentives to take risk 
through the sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock volatility.  
 
In line with Chan et al. (2001) R&D expenditures is scaled by total sales over the same period. 
Because their payoffs also present a high degree of uncertainty, I use advertising expenditures 
scaled by total sales as an indicator of high-risk investments. Like Cheng (2008) I include the 
amount of acquisitions scaled by total assets as a third risk measure. To mitigate their large 
positive skewness and kurtosis, I increment the three ratios by one and take their natural 
logarithm. The regressions involving these ex-ante measures of risk include the same control 
variables as in section 3.4 and are estimated using fixed firm effects. Because of these fixed 
firm effects, within-firm variation can be positive as well as negative (unlike the ratios which 
are bounded below at zero). 
 
---- Table 7 about here ---- 
 
The regression results are reported in Table 7. For all the risk-taking measures, the effect of 
foreign ownership is positive and statistically significant. In contrast, the effect of institutional 
ownership is either negative or insignificant, which confirms the results based on performance 
volatility. Cross-sectional regressions using random effect Tobit (not tabulated) reveal a 
similarly positive effect from foreign ownership. Hence, foreign investors appear not only to 
be associated with more high-risk investments, but increases in their shareholdings can also 
be linked to significant increases in all categories of risky investments. Inspection of the other 
covariates shows that increases in firm size are associated with higher acquisition activity 
which echoes the greater involvement of large firms in acquisitions shown in cross-sectional 
regressions. On the other hand, increases in firm size are not associated with higher R&D 
although large Japanese firms tend to exhibit a higher R&D intensity (Okada, 2005; Nagaoka, 
2006; Nguyen et al., 2010). Surprisingly, both R&D and advertising expenditures appear to 
decrease with an increase in a firm’s profitability. This is because increases in profitability 
stem from higher sales which mechanically decrease R&D and advertising intensities. David 
et al. (2006) document a similar effect. Finally, the positive coefficient on firm age appears to 
pick up the strong increase in all these categories of risky investments over the sample period 
(in cross-sectional regressions, the effect of firm age happens to be negative).  
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4. Conclusion 
Several stylized facts distinguish Japanese firms in cross-country studies. One of them is their 
extremely high level of liquid assets. For instance, Dittmar et al. (2003) show that corporate 
cash reserves in Japan is twice as large as in other countries. This precautionary behavior is 
consistent with a high degree of risk aversion. In fact, Japanese firms exhibit the lowest cash 
flow volatility in the sample analyzed by John et al. (2008). Hence, the growing involvement 
of foreign investors, and particularly US institutional investors, is likely to have induced a 
significant change in their business policies. In line with this argument, Ahmadjian and 
Robbins (2005) observe a significant increase in restructuring while Baba (2009) finds that 
Japanese firms have increased their dividends following increases in foreign ownership. 
Hamao et al. (2010) suggest that the reason why foreign investors wield a disproportionate 
influence on Japanese firms is because they facilitate the actions of activist funds. A more 
critical factor seems to be that foreign investors are less likely to be hindered by business ties 
with local firms unlike domestic institutions (Chen et al., 2007; Ferreira and Matos, 2008; 
Aggarwal et al., 2011).   
 
In this paper, I have hypothesized that foreign investors have also prompted Japanese firms to 
increase their risk taking. The empirical results based on a large sample of firms listed over 
the period 1998-2007 overwhelmingly support this hypothesis. All the risk-taking proxies 
represented by ROA, Tobin’s Q and stock return volatility increase with the level of foreign 
ownership. The estimates are not only statistically significant, but their magnitude is 
comparable to the effect of firm size and leverage, which are well-known for their potential to 
reduce or increase risk.  
 
After controlling for the endogeneity of ownership, the influence of foreign investors is found 
to be even stronger, especially for ROA volatility. I explain this outcome by the fact that 
foreign investors have targeted low-risk firms with the objective of mitigating the factors 
responsible for their excessive level of risk aversion. Consistent with this view, Baba (2009) 
indicates that foreign investors tend to select cash-rich firms (with the aim of extracting their 
excess cash) which should also display a lower risk profile. Further analysis using fixed firm 
effect regressions show that increases in foreign ownership are associated with increases in all 
the indicators of performance volatility. Several ex-ante measures of risk, such as R&D 
intensity and acquisitions, are also found to increase with an increase in foreign ownership.  
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Hence, whilst they have publicly and forcefully resisted the pressure of foreign investors, 
Japanese firms appear to have been influenced by the presence of the latter in their ownership 
structure. Overall this result supports the idea that foreign ownership matters. By affecting 
critical decisions, such as the degree of risk a firm should take, foreign investors also seem to 
have the power to affect firm performance. This outcome is consistent with the recent 
literature documenting the strong influence of foreign investors outside of the US.  
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Table 1:  
Descriptive statistics for the sample  
 
Variables Mean Std dev   Pctile 25 Median Pctile 75 
       
Panel A: Cross-sectional data (N = 1,615 firm observations) 
 
Standard deviation of performance  
ROA (in %) 2.469 2.116 1.20 1.91 3.00 
Ln(Q) 0.205 0.163  0.10 0.16 0.26 
Stock return (in %) 11.754 4.474 8.83 11.01 13.61 
      
Average firm characteristics and instrumental variables 
Foreign ownership (in %) 8.590 8.910  2.07 5.55 12.34 
Institutional ownership (in %) 27.702 13.570 16.79 26.34 37.73 
ROA (in %) 4.766 3.978 2.45 4.11 6.40 
Tobin’s Q 1.293 1.170 0.93 1.08 1.29 
Ln(total assets) 11.339 1.469 10.33 11.12 12.15 
Total debt/Total assets 0.247 0.180 0.09 0.23 0.37 
Capex/sales 0.049 0.066 0.02 0.04 0.06 
Firm age 30.81 19.07 9.5 39.5 47.5 
ADR (dummy) in 1998 0.058 0.234 0 0 0 
MSCI (dummy) in 1998 0.147 0.354 0 0 0 
   
Panel B: Time series cross-sectional data (N = 15,619 firm-year observations) 
   
Absolute deviation from predicted performance 
ROA (in %) 1.728 2.199  0.50 1.12 2.17 
Ln(Q) 0.131 0.164  0.04 0.09 0.16 
Return volatility (in %) 10.710 6.589 6.51 9.22 13.14 
   
Ex ante measures of risk  
R&D/sales (in %) 1.842 8.167 0 0.56 2.44 
Advertising/ sales (in %) 0.539 1.795 0 0 0.27 
Acquisitions/total assets (in %) 0.225 3.234 0 0 0 
Acquisition dummy 0.133 0.340 0 0 0 
 
The sample consists of 1,615 firms listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange over the period 1998-2007. In 
Panel A, standard deviation of performance is calculated over the 10-year sample period. ROA is 
operating income over total assets. Tobin’s Q is the market to book value of assets. Returns are 
calculated monthly and adjusted for dividends and stock splits. Firm age is the number of years since 
the firm’s listing. ADR indicates that the firm had an American Depository Receipt in 1998. MSCI 
indicates membership in the MSCI World index in 1998. In Panel B, absolute deviation from predicted 
performance is described in equations 2-4. Return volatility is calculated over the 12-month period 
preceding the firm’s accounting year-end.  
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Table 2 
Cross-sectional regressions of performance volatility on foreign ownership 
  
  Standard deviation of performance measure using 
 ROA  Ln(Q)   Stock return 
      
FOREIGN 0.0654 *** 0.0057 *** 0.1255 *** 
 (6.29)  (7.60)  (6.86)  
INST -0.0132 *** -0.0006 * -0.0480 *** 
 (-2.99)  (-1.67)  (-5.16)  
ROA -0.0331  0.0011  -0.1610 *** 
 (-0.68)  (0.42)  (-3.33)  
LNTA -0.4847 *** -0.0293 *** -1.2282 *** 
 (-7.60)  (-6.15)  (-10.19)  
DEBT 1.5083 *** -0.0702 *** 8.8115 *** 
 (4.74)  (-3.18)  (14.22)  
CAPEX -0.5316  0.1558 ** -6.3399 *** 
 (-0.63)  (2.04)  (-4.83)  
AGE -0.0138 *** -0.0004  0.0145 * 
 (-3.07)  (-1.51)  (1.91)  
    
Fixed effects industry industry industry  
    
F value 14.35 *** 21.00 *** 31.41 *** 
R2 0.2692   0.3318   0.3870   
 
The sample consists of 1,615 firms listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange over the period 1998-2007. 
Performance variability is calculated over the 10-year sample period. ROA is operating income over 
total assets. Ln(Q) is the log of market to book value of assets. Stock returns are adjusted for dividends 
and stock splits. All the explanatory variables are averaged over the sample period. FOREIGN is the 
percentage of shares owned by foreign investors. INST is the percentage of shares owned by domestic 
financial institutions. LNTA is the log of total assets. DEBT is total debt over total assets. CAPEX is 
capital expenditures over sales. AGE is the number of years since the firm’s listing. All regressions 
include industry dummies using the Tokyo Stock Exchange’s industry classification. Standard errors 
are corrected for heteroskedasticity. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
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Table 3:  
Analysis by level of foreign ownership and instrument value 
 
instrument = ADR (1998) instrument = MSCI (1998) 
FOREIGN  
= low  = high 
FOREIGN 
= low = high  
Panel A: Distribution of firms 
instrument = 1 0.004 0.054 0.012 0.136 
instrument = 0 0.496 0.446 0.489 0.364 
Panel B: Unexplained volatility of ROA 
instrument = 1 -0.196 0.575 0.156 0.487 
instrument = 0 -0.294 0.260 -0.304 0.222 
test of difference  2.316 ** 2.137 **
Panel C: Unexplained volatility of Ln(Q) 
instrument = 1 -0.012 0.024 0.049 0.023 
instrument = 0 -0.027 0.027 -0.029 0.029 
test of difference  -0.277 -0.647 
Panel D: Unexplained volatility of stock returns 
instrument = 1 -2.199 0.351 -0.844 0.626 
instrument = 0 -0.566 0.609 -0.574 0.564 
test of difference  -0.914 0.281 
The sample consists of 1,615 firms listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange over the period 1998-2007. 
FOREIGN = high (= low) if foreign ownership is above (below) the sample’s median. Instrument 
refers to the ADR dummy for columns 2-3 and to the MSCI dummy for columns 4-5. In Panel A, the 
equality of proportion of high foreign ownership across values of the instrument is rejected for both 
ADR (z = 8.51) and MSCI (z = 14.05). In Panels B-D, the unexplained volatility of performance is the 
residual of the cross-sectional regressions without foreign ownership (i.e. Equation 1 without the 
FOREIGN variable). The test of difference in unexplained performance volatility across values of the 
instrument is only indicated for FOREIGN = high. ** indicates significance at the 5% level. 
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Table 4:  
Cross-sectional regressions with instrumented foreign ownership 
 
 1st stage:   2nd stage: standard deviation of performance 
  FOREIGN ROA Ln(Q)  Return   
      
Predicted FOREIGN   0.1626 *** 0.0083*** 0.1506*** 
   (5.15)  (3.63)  (2.81)  
ADR (in 1998) 3.0392***     
  (3.19)      
MSCI (in 1998) 4.6175***     
  (6.80)      
INST 0.0515***  -0.0194 *** -0.0008** -0.0496*** 
 (2.79)   (-4.04)  (-2.00)  (-5.14)  
ROA 0.4859***  -0.0815  -0.0001  -0.1735*** 
 (6.72)   (-1.63)  (-0.05)  (-3.08)  
LNTA 2.3368***  -0.7903 *** -0.0372*** -1.3070*** 
 (11.40)   (-6.24)  (-4.21)  (-5.90)  
DEBT -8.8917***  2.4030 *** -0.0471  9.0425*** 
 (-7.32)   (5.57)  (-1.55)  (11.68)  
CAPEX 15.0883***  -1.9932 ** 0.1179  -6.7172*** 
 (2.77)   (-1.98)  (1.41)  (-4.63)  
AGE -0.0437***  -0.0104 ** -0.0004  0.0153** 
 (-3.20)   (-2.40)  (-1.25)  (2.01)  
      
Fixed effects industry   industry  industry  industry  
      
F-test instruments 37.71***     
Partial R2 0.0573      
Sargan 2   0.058  0.525  3.43* 
p-value   0.8092  0.4686  0.064  
Durbin 2   14.019 *** 1.481  0.261  
Wu-Hausman F-stat   13.914 *** 1.463  0.255  
         
F value 31.17***  11.13 *** 18.00*** 31.49*** 
R2 0.4843     0.1776   0.3214   0.3857   
 
The sample consists of 1,615 firms listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange over the period 1998-2007. 
Performance variability is calculated over the whole sample period. ROA is operating income over 
total assets. Ln(Q) is the log of market to book value of assets. Stock returns are adjusted for dividends 
and stock splits. All the explanatory variables are averaged over the sample period. FOREIGN is the 
percentage of shares owned by foreign investors. INST is the percentage of shares owned by domestic 
financial institutions. LNTA is the log of total assets. DEBT is total debt over total assets. CAPEX is 
capital expenditures over sales. AGE is the number of years since the firm’s listing. ADR indicates 
that the firm had an ADR in 1998. MSCI indicates that the firm was a constituent of the MSCI World 
index in 1998. All regressions include industry dummies using the Tokyo Stock Exchange’s industry 
classification. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity. The Sargan 2 statistic tests the 
hypothesis that the instruments (ADR and MSCI) are uncorrelated with the unexplained variability in 
firm performance. The Durbin 2 and Wu-Hausman F-statistics test the hypothesis that FOREIGN is 
exogenous. ***, **, * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. 
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Table 5:  
Transition probabilities between quartiles of foreign and institutional ownership  
 
 Foreign ownership quartile (year N+1) 
Low = 1 2 3 High = 4
Foreign ownership 
quartile (year N)     
Low = 1 79.2 17.2 2.7 0.8
2 16.9 65.8 15.9 1.4
3 1.2 16.7 68.3 13.8
High = 4 0.1 0.8 13.2 86.0
 
 Institutional ownership quartile (year N+1)
Low = 1 2 3 High = 4
Institutional ownership 
quartile (year N)     
Low = 1 83.9 15.0 1.0 0.2
2 7.6 76.2 15.6 0.6
3 0.5 9.0 77.7 12.8
High = 4 0.1 0.3 8.8 90.8
 
The sample consists of 15,619 firm-year observations from 1998 to 2007. 
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Table 6:  
Fixed-effect regressions of performance volatility on foreign ownership 
 
 
Absolute deviation from  
predicted performance 12-month stock 
return volatility   ROA  Ln(Q)  
     
FOREIGN 0.0252 *** 0.0016 *** 0.0465 ***
 (3.62)  (3.46)  (3.23)  
INST 0.0050  -0.0005  -0.0289 ** 
 (1.07)  (-1.44)  (-2.47)  
ROA -0.1012 *** 0.0029 *** 0.0289  
 (-4.68)  (3.02)  (1.11)  
LNTA -0.9953 *** -0.1124 *** -1.4676 ***
 (-4.45)  (-8.62)  (-3.34)  
DEBT -0.5869  0.0204  6.7684 ***
 (-1.34)  (0.55)  (4.52)  
CAPEX 0.6749 ** 0.0673 ** -3.8512 ***
 (2.03)  (2.29)  (-2.98)  
AGE 0.0305 *** -0.0013 * -0.7955 ***
 (2.98)  (-1.91)  (-26.46)  
      
Fixed effects firm/year  firm/year  firm/year  
     
F value 15.22 *** 32.98 *** 32.64 ***
R2 0.5209  0.4272  0.4753  
 
Predicted performance is described in equations 2-3. Absolute deviation from predicted performance 
is the absolute value of the residual excluding firm effects described in equation 4. ROA is operating 
income over total assets. Q is the market to book value of assets. Return volatility is calculated using 
12 monthly returns. FOREIGN is the percentage of shares owned by foreign investors. INST is the 
percentage of shares owned by domestic financial institutions. LNTA is the log of total assets. DEBT 
is total debt over total assets. CAPEX is capital expenditures over sales. AGE is the number of years 
since the firm’s listing. The sample consists of 15,619 firm-year observations. The equations are 
estimated using OLS with fixed firm and year effects and standard errors clustered by firm. ***, **, * 
indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%. 
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Table 7:  
Fixed-effect regressions with three ex-ante measures of risk  
 
 
R&D 
expenses/sales 
Advertising 
expenses/sales 
Acquisitions 
/total assets  
     
FOREIGN 0.0119 *** 0.0032 *** 0.0265 *** 
 (2.85)  (3.01)  (4.58)  
INST 0.0001  -0.0004  -0.0095 ** 
 (0.03)  (-0.52)  (-2.13)  
ROA -0.0497 *** -0.0100 *** 0.0085  
 (-8.65)  (-6.28)  (1.35)  
LNTA -0.0517  -0.0636 *** 0.5028 *** 
 (-0.59)  (-3.02)  (4.13)  
DEBT -0.7531 *** 0.1306 ** -0.3418  
 (-3.28)  (2.15)  (-1.11)  
CAPEX -0.0405  -0.0669  0.3732  
 (-0.21)  (-0.99)  (1.09)  
AGE 0.0628 *** 0.0289 *** 0.0918 *** 
 (8.77)  (14.88)  (10.45)  
     
Fixed effects firm/year firm/year firm/year  
     
F value 20.82 *** 32.07 *** 29.59 *** 
R2 0.8946  0.7069  0.3638  
 
The dependent variables R&D/sales, Advertising/sales and Acquisitions/total assets are incremented 
by one and logged to mitigate the influence of outliers. FOREIGN is the percentage of shares owned 
by foreign investors. INST is the percentage of shares owned by domestic financial institutions. ROA 
is operating income over total assets. LNTA is the log of total assets. DEBT is total debt over total 
assets. CAPEX is capital expenditures over sales. AGE is the number of years since the firm’s listing. 
The equations are estimated using OLS with fixed firm and year effects and standard errors clustered 
by firm. The sample consists of 15,619 firm-year observations. ***, **, * indicate significance at 1%, 
5% and 10%.  
 
